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Huge ICM Implications
Here is the setup….
We are 2/3 at the final table of the $88 $20k GTD on ACR. We are currently in the SB with 49.2bb. To my left, in the BB, is the short stack (8.4bb), who seems to be very tight based on what little we have seen, with a VPIP of only 12 with 51 hands played against. The big stack has 115bb, and has been running over the final table. He has played in nearly every hand since reaching the FT, and has knocked out 4 of the last 5….sometimes getting the chips in ahead, and sometimes sucking out. He is a very good player, and consistently puts opponents to the test. He is definitely playing for the win.
The big stack bully is on the button and opens for 2.5x. I look down at TT, and decide to 3-bet to 8.5x in hopes to get the BB heads up for all of his chips. Unfortunately, that plan fails, because the BB folds and the Button shoves all-in to put my tournament life at stake. This is a huge bet to call (40.7bb), because I have 6x the amount of chips as the short stack, and should easily be able to coast to at least a 2nd place finish. The pay jump is significant: $900. Here are the payouts for 1-3:
1- $4872
2- $3260
3- $2363
I really felt like I was ahead, but if I was, I am probably looking at a flip. Do I really want to flip for $900? If someone out there is an ICM guru, can you break down the numbers for this spot? Call or fold?
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15 Replies
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This is a reluctant fold for me. The ICM implications are too big at this point and you will undoubtedly get even better spots against the opponent, hopefully when the shorty busts and there are no ICM implications. I can maybe do the ICM math here if you give me what you think his range is or what your equity is against his range. @CaptainWalleye
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When the hand started, your ICM value was $3,602.
If you fold to the shove, your ICM value would be $3,512.
If you call and win, your ICM value would be $4,149.
If you call and lose, you are busted and earn $2,363.
So from an ICM perspective your equity to call needs to be 64.3% = (3,512-2,363) / (4,149-2,363)
Wouldn’t mind some wizards to check my work @ARW @Binkley @TaylorMaas @FiveByFive @Jim @rabman50 @Andrew @PokerGeekMN @CaptainWalleye
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ICMIzer says this is a fold, but just barely. If villain is tighter than nash, which I think most villains would be, then it becomes a clearer fold. It is only if they’re very above nash reshove range where this becomes a call. I’ve pasted in the range it computes for villain. Few players, even aggro bullies, are going to be shoving that widely in this spot in my opinion. I’m always surprised by these numbers. Unless I’m calculating this wrong, it suggests to me that we may need to flat some of these kinds of 77-1010 type holdings in this exact spot. In game, I’d have a tough time folding.
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Awesome Post 5by5
It’s painful to fold TT in this spot but I think it’s the logical thing to do.
The big stack bully likely has a super wide range when he opens. When he puts you all-in, this range is much smaller than before. I would expect a competent big stack to avoid a silly risk like getting it in against the medium stack after they have shown strength. If I were the big stack with a weakish hand like 87ss, this is a “pick another spot” moment when I see 8.5 bb raise. This means, the villain likely has something worth seeing all 5 community cards. To me, the best hands to do this are broadway hands and pocket pairs. You beat some of that range but it doesn’t look optimal. Although this isn’t exact, I think it’s a logical starting point.
Possible 4-betting range:
Over-pair — (AA – JJ)
Under-pair — (99 – 22)
Two-overs — (AK, AQ, AJ, KQ, KJ, QJ)
Overall
— this range has 24 + 48 + 96 = 168 combos
— you’re 20% to win against 24 combos of over-pairs (AA – JJ).
— you’re 80% to win against 48 combos of under-pairs (99 – 22).
— you’re 50% to win against 96 combos of two overs (AK, AQ, AJ, KQ, KJ, QJ).
You’re beating about 63 of the 168 combos.
You win 37.5% of the time against this 4-bet range.
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@ARW , I think you mixed up something with how you laid this out. If all your range estimates are correct, you have the “win 37.5% of the time” wrong. I’m not sure how you got to the 63/168 combos either.
We are slightly better than 50% vs the two overs (really close to 55%), but lets call it 50% for the sake of easy math, so we break even 96 times, 48 times we win at a 80% rate, and 24 times we win at a 20% clip. That math works out to be an equity of 54.3%. If we up the vs two overs to 55%, then we have 57.1% equity.
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Thank you @TaylorMaas ,
I did my 63 of 168 wrong.
Here is how:
20% of 24 is ~5
80% of 48 is ~38
50% of 96 is ~48
91 of 168 combos or 54.167%
Teachers make mistakes too.
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Based on Rob’s initial comments, I think we can put our villain as wider than Nash would suggest. Making the decision here a reluctant call.
But again, I think the decision tree needs to be changed to not 3-bet in this spot.
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In hindsight, I think you are right @TaylorMaas that a call would be better than a 3-bet. However, my thinking was that the raise would cause Button to fold out some of his unsuited broadway cards (KQ, KJ, KT, QJ, QT, JT) and some aces (AT, A9, A8, A7, etc.). Postflop would be challenging if an overcard comes on the flop against this particular opponent. Although I don’t like the idea of being 3-handed after the flop with TT, if the BB did make the call, the Button would likely call the additional 6bb as well and we essentially have 2 hands vs. 1 to eliminate the short stack.
To be clear about my statement about wanting to get the BB heads up for all his chips, that was a hope, not a strategy with my 3-bet. The sizing of the 3-bet was going to be close to his chip stack anyway, so I just gave him the option to be all in with two over cards. If he calls and then the Button shoves, it is an easy fold.
The truth is, I just didn’t consider that the Button would shove over the top of my 3-bet with how deep we were…It was a great play, and I will definitely keep this one in the memory bank for similar spots in the future.
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All great comments so far. Based on the pay jump worth 10 buyins, I agree that it’s an ICM fold.
Even though you know that the Villain is likely just leveraging the ICM pressure, your options are limited. Fold here and play very tight until the short stack either busts or doubles.
I thought it’d be interesting to explore circumstances where we could argue for a call. Suppose villain would 3bet smaller (say to 20bbs) with the strongest pairs (TT+). But they jam with all suited broadways, suited aces, pairs 99 thru 55, and ATo+ and KQo.
Facing this range, TT has 65% equity, which is a profitable call.
Of course, we can’t know with certainty that villain has this exact 4bet shoving range.
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Some good comments here. I’ll trust Steve’s math, and it just points out how bad of a spot it is for us and gives us a very awkward decision. To avoid this, we need to play much more passive than we normally would, and just call preflop. We don’t want to give our opponent an opportunity to put out tournament life on the line so we need to play small ball.
And the line, “go to 8.5x to try and get the BB heads up” is totally backwards. First, we haven’t seen a decision from the BB yet, and not even one that would lead us to believe he wants to play for all his chips at this point. Second, we incentive him to fold here. His big win in this spot is not a double, but instead you (or your opponent) busting before he does. You 3 betting gives him reason to watch the rest of the hand play out without him.
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This is all really great stuff, thanks for the input. I wish I could upload a video of the decision in real time (I did record it), but unfortunately video is not an option for the forum.
I agonized and used a bunch of my time bank for this decision. In the end, I made the call. I wasn’t making the ICM calculations real-time, but I knew that it was likely +EV to fold. Because I had been watching this player’s aggressive actions and wide range, I came to the conclusion that it was a close enough spot to grit my teeth and call. As I mentioned, I believed I was probably ahead at the time, but not by much. If only I could win this flip, I would have a much better chance heads-up to seal the Bink…. I had a nice 2nd place finish the day before in a bigger tournament, and although the money was great, I really wanted to sit atop one of these huge field tourneys. This most likely had something to do with the “call” decision as well.
As it turns out, he held 55 and my TT held. Big stack guy went on to lose the rest of his chips to the former short stack (ICM suicide), and after a nice heads up battle, the Hero takes it down.
This is a great discussion, and even better experience, because I hope to have the same type of decision for real “life changing money” in a big tourney sometime down the line. Thanks again for all of the great analysis!
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Great discussion @CaptainWalleye and wonderful comments from the crew; I always learn a lot just learning these. if you want to upload it for me somewhere I can upload to youtube and share the link (not necessary but if you wanted); good stuff.
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Congrats on the deep run Rob. One point that I haven’t seen mentioned yet is your comment about sizing your 3-bet to get heads-up vs. BB. That is flawed thinking. You have no information yet on the strength of BB’s hand so all you should be considering is your decision vs. aggro’s big stack open. With ICM considerations, this is an easy call and revaluate post flop.
This line also conceals the strength of your hand which A-may induce BB to squeeze and B-gives you a (wide open) range advantage post flop vs. big stack.
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